Introduction
In this chapter we discuss old-fashioned cognitive development from the point of view of two modern approaches, connectionism, and non-linear dynamical system theory. Old-fashioned cognitive development refers to the development of typical human cognitive capabilities, such as reasoning, planning, and abstract thinking.
These abilities are distinctively human, in contrast to abilities usually studied in connectionism and the dynamic system approach, which generally focus on perception, pattern recognition, association, motor action, and simple memory. Such abilities are of interest, of course, but do not constitute the greatest challenge for researchers in cognitive development. Yet, connectionists and dynamic system modelers do claim that their models are relevant to higher cognitive functioning. This is apparent in their rejection of other approaches, such as the Piagetian and the information processing accounts of development. The main assertion in both the connectionist and the dynamic system approaches is that higher cognitive functioning is largely based on non-symbolic, graded, and dynamic properties, of which these same approaches provide the best account.
In this chapter, we criticize this claim. Both the connectionist and the dynamic system approach have made important contributions to current developmental Van der Maas and Raijmakers 2 psychology, including solutions to problems of the Piagetian and information processing accounts. Examples are the explanation of novel forms of thinking in the dynamic system approach (van der Maas & Hopkins, 1998) , and the integration of learning and development in connectionist approaches (Quartz, 1993) . In our view, however, the claim concerning non-symbolic higher order cognition is overstated. A critical examination of this claim might help in developing more realistic models.
To explain our position, we focus on sudden transitions in cognitive development. There is ample evidence for domain-specific transitions, for instance, in the Piagetian concrete operational and formal operational tasks (van der Maas & Hopkins, 1998) . Our key example will be the famous balance scale task as applied to access proportional reasoning. A typical item is shown in Figure 1 .
Insert Figure 1 about here
Children have to predict the movement of the scale when the blocks, as depicted in Figure 1 , are removed. It is well known that children use different rules or strategies to solve such items (Jansen & van der Maas, 2002) . Young children will focus on the weights and ignore the distance information. Older children and many adults understand that the weight and distance cues conflict in the item that is displayed in Figure 1 , but only a small minority understands the correct torque rule that provides the solution to this conflict. The majority of people guess or use alternative rules, like the compensation rule, which is based on the sums of weight and distance on each side of the fulcrum. Siegler (1976 Siegler ( , 1981 showed that children's Van der Maas and Raijmakers 3 progression on this task takes place by the use of increasingly more complex rules. This is evident in children's responses and in their verbal explanations.
There are three reasons that this task constitutes an interesting case for our present discussion. First, the balance scale task appeals to proportional reasoning.
Proportional reasoning that is required in the balance scale task clearly classifies as higher cognitive functioning. Interestingly, the data on this task show evidence for both graded continuous processing and for symbolic discrete processing (Jansen & van der Maas, 2002) . Second, there exists a large body of empirical results on this task, starting with the work of Siegler (1976 Siegler ( , 1981 . A serious model for this task should explain the various well-established results, such as the diversity of rules, the order of rules, some deviations of rules, response time patterns, and transitions. Third, the balance scale task is used as a benchmark task in computational modeling.
Specifically, in the last 25 years a number of symbolic and connectionist models have been proposed to explain the empirical results (van Rijn, van Someren, & van der Maas, 2003) .
The main computational models for balance scale task performance are the connectionist model of McClelland (1989 McClelland ( , 1995 , the cascade correlation network model of Shultz, Mareshal and Schmidt (1994) , and the ACT-R model of van Rijn, van Someren, and van der Maas (2003) . The ACT-R model is based on a (sub) symbolic architecture. In view of the topics of this book, we concentrate on the connectionist models, and especially on their potential to explain rules and transition between rules in development on the balance scale task. This will provide us with the means to evaluate the general claim that higher cognitive function can be understood in terms of graded, non-symbolic, and dynamic properties of the brain.
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However, there is one issue that has to be resolved first. We presented the connectionist and the dynamic system approach as unitary, because they make the same general claim about cognition, and both reject the traditional symbolic approaches to cognition. In our view the two approaches are very similar indeed.
Because not everyone will subscribe to this view (e.g., Beer, 2000) , we first explain our position with respect to this.
The Relation between Dynamic Systems and Connectionist Models
A narrow definition of connectionism refers mainly to the typical multi-layered feed-forward back-propagation networks, as they are proposed in McClelland and Rumelhart (1986) . We could broaden this view to include cascade correlation networks (Fahlman, 1988) , recurrent networks (cf. Elman, 1995) , and networks based on Adaptive Resonance Theory (Grossberg, 1976) . In fact, at present the field of neural network modeling includes a large number of network types, from the very low level single neuron processes to the very high level neuronal fields. The only common aspect of these models is that they are somehow models of the neural substrate of the brain.
A narrow definition of the dynamic systems approach refers to the well-known work of researchers such as Thelen and Smith (1994) and the dynamic field approach of Spencer and Schöner (2003) . In this definition, the dynamic system approach is a theory of development, in which actions in real time are modeled by means of differential equations. Most applications focus on infant behavioral development with more recent extensions that examine the development of spatial cognition, motor planning dynamics, and 'embodied' cognition in autonomous robots. These Van der Maas and Raijmakers 5 researchers present this theory as a new theory of developmental processes, which provides an alternative to both the standard theories in developmental psychology, and to connectionism (Thelen & Smith, 1994 ; but see also Thelen and Bates, 2003) .
However, alternative accounts have been given. For instance, Van Geert (1991) proposed nonlinear growth models to explain several developmental phenomena. Van der Maas & Molenaar (1992) proposed the use of catastrophe theory to model and test transitions in development. For other examples, we refer to Lewis (2000) . These accounts do not make the same theoretical claims about the relation between dynamic systems theory and other accounts of development.
Our own work is inspired by a broad definition of the dynamic system approach In our view, there is no reason to prefer the narrow definitions of connectionism and the dynamical systems approach. The close similarity between the dynamical field model (Schutte, Spencer, & Schöner, 2003 ) and the connectionist model of the A not B task (Munakata, 1998) supports our view (see also, Thelen and Bates, 2003) . Of course, the choice of definitions makes a large difference in thinking about the relations between the two approaches as we discuss below.
Van der Maas and Raijmakers 6 3. Neural Networks are Dynamical Systems An important and general conclusion that can be stated from the start is that connectionist models are a subset of the larger class of dynamical models, and that, therefore, conflict or competition between the approaches should be absent. Nonlinear dynamical models describe systems in which the new state depends nonlinearly on its old state. In addition, the state can depend on states of other processes (such as other neurons), and on parameters describing external influences. Such models can be formulated either in discrete time (with difference equations) or in continuous time (with differential equations). Mathematical study of such models has revealed very rich and complicated behaviors, such as catastrophic changes, chaotic attractors, and self-organization. It has been shown that many physical, chemical, and biological processes can be modeled this way (Wiggins, 1991) .
Neural network models are dynamical models by definition. The state of neurons or neural systems depends on its earlier states, and most models account for this explicitly. These dependencies are generally also non-linear. Activations of neurons are usually a nonlinear function of the activity of connected neurons. This clearly applies to the many connectionist models applied in developmental psychology.
In this broad definition of nonlinear dynamical systems, it is not really possible to view the dynamic approach as a new theory of development. In the broad definition, the dynamic approach amounts to an application of concepts, techniques, and models from this field to developmental psychology. Such work can be carried out from any theoretical perspective.
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We have argued in the past that many concepts from dynamical system theory are surprisingly consistent with the old Piagetian theory of development (van der Maas, 1995) . Application of nonlinear dynamical system theory may lead to a formalization of Piagetian concepts, such as disequilibrium and equilibration, and not lead to a new theory of development. It might also be fruitful to use nonlinear models to formalize Vygotskian concepts, such as the zone of proximal development, or information processing concepts, such as short-term memory. We do not see this consistency as a disadvantage. New tools to formalize and test developmental theories should be more than welcome. We propose to view the dynamic system account as theory-free, in the same way that statistical methods are largely theory-free.
Nonlinear Phenomena
Three phenomena of nonlinear dynamical systems are highly relevant to developmental psychology. A well-known phenomenon is deterministic chaos.
Deterministic nonlinear dynamical systems may show unpredictable chaotic behavior.
One of the paradoxes of developmental psychology is that virtually all developmental psychologist agree that development during infancy is important for later development, but that strong and convincing relationships between developmental measures from infancy and measures of later development are hard to demonstrate (McCall & Carriger, 1993) . In theory, deterministic chaos may explain this paradox.
It may explain why development in certain respects is so irregular and unpredictable.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to prove this conjecture (certainly the alternative, namely that our measurements are simply too noisy, remains compelling).
Developmental data are relatively sparse and often quite unreliable. Attempts to demonstrate chaos in much more frequent and more reliable psycho-physiological Van der Maas and Raijmakers 8 time series data have generally failed. The reason is that detection of chaos in time series with noisy measurements turned out to be extremely difficult. Demonstrating chaos in developmental data is therefore hardly feasible.
Another famous phenomenon in nonlinear dynamical systems is selforganization. This refers to spontaneous spatiotemporal coherent behavior of the parts of a system in the absence of some pre-specified plan or algorithm that controls this behavior. Such behavior is purely a function of the dynamics of (non-linear) interactions among the system's components. Self-organization has been demonstrated in a variety of physical, chemical, and biological processes. The prototypical example is the Beluzhov-Zabotinsky (BZ) reaction, which displays temporal or spatial self-organization depending on whether the reactors are stirred (Winifree, 1980). As we describe elsewhere (van der Maas & Hopkins, 1998), we view self-organization as the most promising aspect of nonlinear dynamical system theory. The reason is that self-organization could be a mechanism for structural developmental change, as it is proposed in Piagetian theory, but also in many other developmental accounts. Self-organization might be the definite resolution of Fodor's famous learning paradox (Raijmakers & Molenaar, 2004) .
However, like with chaos, to empirically investigate self-organization is no simple matter. Since neural networks are nonlinear dynamical systems, it should be possible to demonstrate self-organization in the learning process of certain types of neural networks. Demonstrating functional self-organization (Raijmakers & Molenaar, 2004) appears to be more difficult than many of us expected. However, phase transitions are critical in self-organizing processes, and thus present an indirect way to study self-organization.
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Below we focus on this third phenomenon of catastrophes or phase transitions.
There is a good deal of evidence for phase transitions in psychological processes, including development. We discuss this evidence, and assess how well various computational models, including connectionist models, can account for such data. We also look at alternative neural network models, in which phase transition can be modeled. As it turns out, it is not simple to construct neural models that really show interesting nonlinear properties.
Phase Transitions
Developmental psychologists entertain different definitions of discontinuous development. The intuitively simple definition focuses on a relatively large change in a relatively short period. This change can be either a acceleration or a sudden jump. In the latter case, the large change occurs instantaneously. We have argued in the past (van der Maas & Molenaar, 1992) that the impasse in the research on discontinuous development (see Brainerd, 1978 ) is due to this informal definition. First, the difference between a acceleration and a sudden jump is not trivial. The definition should be clear with respect to this distinction. Accelerations in development are interesting phenomena, but, as explained below, are not discontinuous. Second, limiting the definition to sudden jumps helps, but an empirical problem remains. How can we detect sudden jumps? The fundamental measurement problem is that we can never be sure about what happens between measurement sessions. Suppose we tested children every week, and found that some children changed suddenly from one state to another. We can not exclude the possibility that Van der Maas and Raijmakers 10 within this week an acceleration took place. This always remains a possibility, irrespective of the measurement frequency.
Here, the dynamic systems approach can help. As we explained above, phase transitions (e.g., bifurcations, catastrophes) are very important in the study of nonlinear dynamical systems. Phase transitions are well understood in this field. They are classified in distinct types (bifurcation types), and many techniques for the analysis and detection of these phenomena exist.
One branch of non-linear dynamical system theory is especially relevant for psychology, and for the social sciences in general. This branch is known as catastrophe theory (Thom, 1975) . From a mathematical point of view, the main ideas of catastrophe theory are now incorporated within bifurcation theory, but from our perspective, this approach is still very relevant. The reason is that catastrophe theory provides possible applications in cases where one does not have at one's disposal a mathematical model of a process. These applications involve archetypical models for phase transitions, and strong criteria for phase transitions.
Cusp Model
In catastrophe theory, discontinuities occur when system states become unstable. A catastrophe is a large sudden jump to a new stable state (attractor), as a function of smooth and small changes in independent control variables. Such catastrophes can have different forms. The simplest form is the cusp catastrophe. What makes the cusp model so useful is that we can derive a number of unique predictions of this model in terms of behavioral properties. Gilmore (1981) called these behavioral properties, of which he distinguished eight, catastrophe flags. We will explain five of them with the example in Figure 2 . First, sudden jumps occur when we exert sufficient vertical pressure on the spoon, while increasing the horizontal force smoothly. At a given moment, the present stable state will become unstable, and the spoon will switch abruptly to the other side. In switching, it will pass the inaccessible state in between the two stable states. This inaccessibility, the second flag, makes this model fundamentally different from models that define discontinuities as accelerations. In such models, all intermediate states are stable.
Third, for certain control values, two stable states exists, implying bimodality, which is another important flag. Fourth, when increasing the splitting factor starting at zero (for a = 0), the system has to "choose" between the two emerging states. This is called divergence. Finally, we have hysteresis. This refers to the fact that the sudden jumps from left to right, and visa versa, do not take place at the same values of the horizontal pressure. This is caused by bistability. You have to press relatively hard to force the spoon to jump. A well-known example is the transition from water to ice and visa versa. In shock free conditions, water freezes at -4 0 Celsius, whereas ice melts at 0 0 Celsius.
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We used the catastrophe flags to study the transition between rules that children apply in the balance scale task . We focused on the transition from rule I to rule II, as some prior support for this transition had been established. Children who apply either rule I or rule II respond differently to so-called distance items. These are items where the weights are the same, and only the distances to the midpoint of the fulcrum differ. Rule I children think that balance scales with such a configuration of weights will remain in balance, whereas rule II users correctly use the distance information. Rule II users, like rule I children, fail to do so when the number of weights are unequal. The initial evidence for a sudden transition concerns bimodality: scores on sets of distance items are usually strongly bimodally distributed.
Based on the work of Siegler (1976) and Siegler and Chen (1998) , we hypothesized that encoding distance information is the relevant normal factor in this case. By changing the distance difference step by step, we tried to find sudden switches between incorrect and correct answer, and possibly also hysteresis. In our experiment, we varied the distance difference from 1 to 5, and back from 5 to 1. In control experiments, we reversed these series (with similar results) and checked whether irrelevant changes in the stimuli (color) also caused jumps and hysteresis (however, this was not the case).
The results were as follows. The large majority of children are stable rule I or rule II users. They give the same answer to all items. About 5 % of children show hysteresis patterns. We tested this in several ways, and although small, this percentage
Van der Maas and Raijmakers 13 could not be ascribed to chance, that is, it is a statistically significant effect. In combination with the finding of bimodality, these results support the hypothesis of discontinuous development in the balance scale task. However, we did not find divergence. Also a larger percentage of hysteresis patterns would make our point stronger.
Other Recent Results in Balance Scale Research
To evaluate the connectionist models of the balance scale task, we review some other recent results (see van der Maas, Jansen, & Raijmakers, 2004, for a more comprehensive review). Some doubts have been raised about the rules proposed by Siegler (1976 Siegler ( , 1981 . Although this does not pose a fundamental problem, additional rules may exist. Many children and adults seem to use compensation rules. They fail to understand the torque rule, and instead compare the sums of weights and distances.
More troublesome is that the classification of children into rule-using categories using the rule assessment method of Siegler might be less robust than originally thought.
For the rules assessment method, it is essential that only the type of the balance scale item matters, and not the actual number of weights and the distances. Clearly the latter may vary within given item types. Rule I users should fail all conflict distance items, and rule II users should succeed on all distance items, irrespective of the actual values of the weights and distances. Ferretti and Butterfield (1986) varied the torque differences (TD) in balance scale items and showed that these differences within item types influences rule classification. For example, given 2 weights on position 5 on the left, and 3 weights on position 1 on the right, the torque to the left will equal 7. Compare this to the Van der Maas and Raijmakers 14 situation where 1 weight on position 4 on the left, and 3 weights on position 1 on the right; the TD is only 1. These are both conflict distance items, but the first is perhaps easier than the second. The finding of TD greatly undermines the rule model and was used by the connectionists to distinguish their models (that show the TD effect) from symbol-oriented models, and to argue for a more graded non-symbolic interpretation of the balance scale rules. However Jansen and van der Maas (1997) offered two counter arguments. First they re-analyzed the data of Ferretti and Butterfield. Ferretti and Butterfield used four levels of torque difference (TD). The fourth level is very extreme, and Jansen and van der Maas demonstrated that the TD effect was solely due to this very extreme level, which never actually occurs in any known balance scale test (see Figure 3) . Second, they improved the rule assessment method by using latent class analysis. This statistical technique makes it possible to test the use of rules statistically. It is technique to detect types or latent groups when data are categorical (Heinen, 1996; McCutcheon, 1987) . The basic idea is to explain the dependencies between responses to items by latent classes so that within classes the responses are independent. In explanatory latent class analysis no a priori hypotheses about the classes are required. In confirmatory analysis specific hypotheses about the occurrence or type of latent classes can be tested. An important advantage of latent class analysis above other techniques is that the goodness of fit can be investigated with well-known statistical criteria. Jansen and van der Maas (2002) give a short introduction to this technique in the context of the balance scale task and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of latent class analysis. van der Maas (1997, 2002) analyzed responses for each item type of the balance scale test separately to test the homogeneity of items with item types. Homogeneity can be tested by using equality constraints between balance scale items of the same type. These constraints Van der Maas and Raijmakers 15 imply that the probability of an answer is equal between items. They found that in most cases responses appeared to be homogeneous.
Insert Figure 3 about here Thus, as van Rijn, van Someren, and van der Maas (2003) argue, any account of the data must address the question why children's behavior is homogenous for moderate torque difference levels, and heterogeneous for extreme torque differences.
Finally, van der Maas and Jansen (2003) analyzed response times to balance scale items. They collected data with a computerized test, and analyzed the response times of each rule with linear (mixed effects) models. They showed that the response time results are very well predicted using the rule model of Siegler. With respect to this, we give one example. We used one rather odd item type, which we call the weight distance items. These are items with a larger number of weights on the side with the larger distance. They are odd in that all rules should lead to the correct answer, and so these items have no discriminatory value. However, if we look at response times, these items are of interest. According to the rule model of Siegler, subjects using rule I or II will only look at the weights. Since these differ, they immediately choose a response. Older subjects (including undergraduates in our sample), using rule III and higher, are supposed to makes additional processing steps.
They also first compare the number of weights, but then they compare the distances, and finally they check whether the largest number of weights is on the side with the larger distance. So they make two additional steps, and are thus expected to be slower than the younger children, who use rule I or II. As shown in Figure 4 , younger Van der Maas and Raijmakers 16 children, in spite of the fact that they process information slower, are much faster than the older subjects.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Do Connectionist Models Explain the Development of Proportional
Reasoning?
Van Rijn et al. (2003) give an overview of computational models of the balance scale task. Between 1978 and 1996, several symbolic models were proposed; in the nineties they were followed by connectionist models; and recently van Rijn et al. (2003) proposed an Act-R model. We will not review the symbolic models, but rather focus on the connectionist models: the feedforward backpropagation (PDP) model of McClelland (1989 McClelland ( , 1995 and the cascade correlation (CC) model of Shultz, Mareschal and Schmidt (1994) .
The first issue concerns the rules. The connectionists employ two arguments.
First, when they simulated data with their models and subjected these data to the rule assessment method of Siegler, they roughly found the same rules, and also the same progression through rules. Second, to explain the discrepancy between perfect rule use and the simulations, they used the torque difference (TD) finding of Ferretti and Butterfield. They argued that only the connectionist models were able to explain the TD effect. In addition, they use the TD effect to argue that information processing on this task is much more gradual than expected. But as we explained above, the TD effect is less convincing than suggested. It only exists for very extreme torque
Van der Maas and Raijmakers 17 differences. Models should explain the absence of the TD effect for low and moderate TD levels, and the presence of a TD effect for very high levels of TD.
Jansen and van der Maas (1997) simulated data with the PDP model, and analyzed the data with latent class analysis. They compared the results to data of children on exactly the same item set. They showed that the results were very different. Although the latent class models for children did show deviations from the rules, they generally confirm the use of rules. The latent class analysis of the PDP model data was a failure. There were no clear classes, and often fitting latent class model could not be found. Also the data of children appeared to be rather homogeneous within item types (no TD effects), whereas the PDP data were very heterogeneous.
Recently, Quinlan, van der Maas, Jansen, Booij, and Rendall (2006) reported a similar analysis of the CC network. The results of the CC model resemble more closely the empirical results. Given data generated by these models, well fitting latent class models were found, and some of the expected rules seem to be present. Support for rules I and II and weighted addition rules were established. Human subjects, in contrast to the CC model, use un-weighted addition and rule IV, that is, the correct rule. In latent class analysis, the CC model was found to employ rules (e.g., always
select the right side of the balance scale) that are not observed in empirical data.
Especially troublesome is that even after extensive learning, the CC model, like the PDP model, fails to use the correct torque rule. The reason for this failure probably lies in the fact that the activation rules of these networks are additive. The networks have many free parameters so that in a limited item set they may mimic multiplication with weighted addition, but they will never generalize to all balance scale items. See also Dawson and Zimmerman, 2003 .
The second issue is discontinuous development. Raijmakers, van Koten, and Molenaar (1996) showed that the PDP model develops continuously. In the original analysis of the PDP (and the CC) model, response patterns were first classified with the rule assessment method, and then these rule were plotted against time (epochs).
Such a plot strongly suggests transitions and stages. Raijmakers, van Koten, and Molenaar (1996) demonstrated that this is an artifact of the data-analytic procedure.
The raw score on each item type should show discontinuities, but these turn out to be very gradual. Also no evidence for bimodality could be found.
The CC model does a better job. In his book, Shultz (2003) showed that the CC model exhibits strong accelerations in performance. Since this model also showed evidence for rule I and II in the latent class analysis, it will also exhibit bimodality on distance items. We did not did perform a hysteresis experiment with either the PDP model or the CC model. One problem is that in this experiment, items are administered without feedback. But without feedback, CC and PDP models will not be subject to any change in their weights. These networks learn by backpropagation of error that depends on feedback of a trainer. Our present conclusion about the connectionist models is that they are largely unconvincing as models of proportional reasoning, and more generally as models of higher cognitive functioning. Connectionists downplay the role of rules, reasoning, and representations, but at the same time demonstrate that they can approximately simulate the main empirical phenomena. Indeed, children are not perfect rule users, and some aspects of their reasoning (rule III, for instance) may be best described with statistical rules, as implemented in connectionist models. But overall these connectionist models are just too simple, they miss essential computational properties, and the evidence for genuine rule use by children is stronger than expected.
Can Neural Networks Model Higher Cognitive Processes?
As we stated in the introduction, the real challenge for psychology lies in typically human abilities, such as reasoning and planning. The main successes of the connectionist approach do not lie here, but rather they can be found in other fields, such as language, memory and perception. As clear from the above, we are not impressed with the connectionist models of higher reasoning processes. Does this mean that we should abandon this approach?
We do not think so. First, neuronal processes evidently form the basis for all our information processing, including formal abstract thinking. Second, connectionist models have been subject to development over a period of 10 to 15 years. The field of neural network modeling has expanded in many directions, and at present there certainly are better types of networks, which can be considered.
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Below we briefly discuss two important general lines of research. The first concerns the coupling of neural models with symbolic models, and the second concerns the utilization of the nonlinear properties of networks.
Hybrid Models
The ACT-R model proposed by van Rijn, van der Maas, and van Someren items in which only the distances differ). Somewhat later in development, children also apperceive the difference in distance, a difference in sum, and, finally proceed to a difference in product of weight and distance. In the ACT-R model, changes in knowledge outside the domain of proportional reasoning play a role (like learning to multiply and increases in the capacity of short term memory) as well as certain ACT-R mechanisms (production rule compilation).
The ACT-R model is not really a hybrid model, although it includes activation equations is does not have a neural model. Such models explicitly combine neural and symbolic properties. Examples can be found in Wermter and Sun (2000) . A related (Tabor, 2002 ; see also Tabor, this volume).
Neural Networks with Functional Self-organization
In the second line of research, the focus is on constructive neural networks. Raijmakers and Molenaar (2004) discuss the learning paradox put forward by Fodor (1980) . The point of this paradox is that learning new concepts necessarily involves composites of innate primitive concepts, since learning is a form of inductive inference involving hypothesis formation and confirmation. Learning fundamentally new concepts seems impossible. The addition of conceptual resources is the only way that a system can become more powerful. If we want to present neural networks as viable models of higher cognition, we will have to show how such models can solve this paradox, and thus how such models can acquire more powerful concepts
Generative neural networks, such as cascade correlation networks, are proposed as constructive neural models that escape the learning paradox (Quartz, 1993) . Raijmakers (1997) & Raijmakers, 2000) . Examples of work in this line can be found in Pollack (1991) , Rodriguez, Wiles, and Elman (1999), and van Ooyen et al. (1995) .
In these three examples, the changes in model parameters are activity driven. The parameter changes in the model of van Ooyen et al. (1995) are considered to be typically maturational, because they are only dependent on a global activity characteristic (the total amount of activity). Raijmakers and Molenaar (2004) and Raijmakers, van der Maas, and Molenaar (1997) present evidence for phase transitions in a specific ART (Adaptive Resonance
Theory, see Grossberg, 1976) network. In this network, Exact ART, phase transitions occur between two learning regimes, based on localized and distributed representation, as a function of small changes in the range of inhibitory and excitatory connections. As yet, the changes in these parameters are not activity dependent. These two types of representation in neural networks form the basis of very different types of computation (Page, 2000) . This is just one example of work in this line of research. As neural networks are nonlinear dynamical systems, they will display all kinds of nonlinear phenomena (such as chaos, bifurcations, and self-organization). The construction of networks in which such properties have a function in learning more powerful concepts is not easy (Tabor, 2002) , but, in our view, it is the most promising way to proceed.
Connectionist and Dynamic Systems Approaches to Development: On the
Cusp of a New Grand Theory or Still Too Distributed?
The title of this section is the title of the symposium that led to this book. In this section we summarize our point of view. We adopt the broad definitions of the Van der Maas and Raijmakers 23 connectionist and the dynamic approach. Connectionist models are dynamic system models, and dynamical system models are applicable to all kinds of theories and models.
In our view, the most promising part of dynamic system theory concerns phase transitions and self-organization, which we study empirically and in simulation research. We are not impressed with the classical connectionist networks, because they fail to model higher cognitive processes, and because they do not show interesting dynamical behavior. The ultimate challenge is to construct neural networks with nonlinear properties that allow for functional self-organization via phase transitions. Clearly, the networks we propose also fail as model of higher cognitive processes, such as proportional reasoning. We can only admit this, and we do not exclude the possibility that at least in the short run, more yields can be expected from (sub-) symbolic approaches, such as ACT-R and hybrid models.
We argued that there is no solution in downplaying the importance of higher cognitive functioning. Our studies of the balance scale showed us that children often use rules that strongly resemble the traditional production rules (if 'equal weight' then 'balance'). At the same time, there is evidence for graded processing (e.g., extreme
TD effects, violations of rules, rule switching). The real challenge is to develop neural network models that capture both phenomena. We opt for a very fundamental research line, in which we focus on self-organizing phase transitions in neural networks. Rule I,II Rule III, IIIc, IV
